Wars are fought not only on the battlefield but also in internal political debates and in stories written after the fact. In the case of the US invasion of Iraq 20 years ago, we are still in this final phase, searching for an elusive consensus on the legacy of the war.
NEW YORK – One advantage historians have over journalists is time, not so much in the sense that they are free from pressing deadlines, but that they have the deeper perspective afforded by the years – or decades – between the events and their act of writing. . Twenty years is not a long time in historical terms, of course. But when it comes to understanding the war the United States launched against Iraq in March 2003, it's all we have.
Not surprisingly, even two decades after the war began, there is no consensus about its legacy. This is to be expected, because all wars are fought three times. First comes the political and internal struggle over the decision to go to war. Then comes the real war and all that happens on the battlefield. Finally, there is a lengthy discussion of the significance of the war: weighing the costs and benefits, identifying the lessons, and making progressive policy recommendations.
The Intervention Decision
The events and other factors that led to the US decision to go to war in Iraq remain opaque and the subject of considerable controversy. Wars tend to fall into two categories: those of necessity and those of choice. Wars of necessity take place when vital interests are at stake and there are no other viable options to defend them. Wars of choice, in contrast, are interventions that are launched when interests are less vital, when there are options other than military force that could be used to protect or advance those interests, or both. Russia's invasion of Ukraine was a war of choice. The armed defense of Ukraine on its territory is something that is necessary.
The war in Iraq was a classic war of choice: the US did not have to fight it. However, not everyone agrees with this assessment. Some argue that vital interests were indeed at stake because Iraq was believed to possess weapons of mass destruction that it could use or share with terrorists. Proponents of the war had little or no confidence that the US had other credible options for eliminating Iraq's alleged WMDs (weapons of mass destruction).
Moreover, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the decision reflected a strong reluctance to tolerate any risk to the US. The idea that Al Qaeda or another terrorist group could strike the US with a nuclear, chemical or biological device was simply unacceptable. Then-Vice President Dick Cheney was the main exponent of this view.
Others, including President George W. Bush and many of his top advisers, also appeared to be motivated by additional calculations, such as pursuing what they saw as a new and major foreign policy opportunity. After 9/11, there was a widespread desire to send a message that the US was not just on the defensive. Rather, it would be a synergistic force in the world, taking the initiative to great effect.
Whatever progress has been made in Afghanistan since the US invaded and ousted the Taliban government that provided a safe haven for the al-Qaeda terrorists who planned and carried out the 9/11 attacks has been deemed insufficient. Many in the Bush administration were motivated by a desire to bring democracy throughout the Middle East, and Iraq was seen as the ideal country to begin the transition. Democratization there would set an example that others across the region could not resist following. And Bush himself wanted to do something big and bold.
I should make it clear that I was a member of the administration at the time, as head of the State Department's Policy Planning staff. Like almost all of my colleagues, I believed that Saddam Hussein possessed WMDs, specifically chemical and biological weapons. Even so, I was not in favor of war. I believed there were other acceptable options, notably measures that could slow or stop the flow of Iraqi oil to Jordan and Turkey, and the possibility of cutting Iraq's oil pipeline to Syria. Doing so would put significant pressure on Saddam to allow inspectors into suspected weapons sites. If these inspections were obstructed, the US could have carried out limited attacks against these facilities.
I wasn't particularly worried about Saddam getting into the business of terrorism. He ruled secular Iraq with an iron fist and considered religious terrorism (with or without Iranian support) to be the greatest threat to his regime. He was also not the type of person to hand over weapons of mass destruction to terrorists, as he wanted to maintain tight control over anything that could be linked to Iraq.
Moreover, I was deeply skeptical that Iraq – or the wider region – was ripe for democracy, given that the economic, political and social conditions were largely lacking. I also predicted that establishing democracy would require a long, protracted military occupation that would likely prove costly on the ground and controversial at home.
The Occupation That Failed
The war itself went better, and certainly faster, than expected – at least in its initial phase. After the invasion in mid-March, it took only about six weeks to defeat the Iraqi armed forces. By May, Bush could claim mission accomplished, meaning that Saddam's government had been eliminated and any organized, armed opposition had disappeared.
But while the American force sent to remove the government was more than capable of winning the war, it could not ensure peace. The basic assumptions that had informed the planning of the invasion—namely, that the Iraqis would welcome the troops as liberators—may have held true for a few weeks, but not after that.
The Bush administration wanted to reap the benefits of nation-building without doing the hard work it required. Worse, officials disbanded the former Iraqi regime's security forces and barred political and administrative roles for many Iraqis who were members of the ruling Ba'ath (Renaissance) Party, even though party membership was often necessary for employment under the regime of Saddam.
As expected, the situation on the ground deteriorated rapidly. Looting and violence became commonplace. Rebel movements and civil war between Sunni and Shia militias destroyed the temporary order that had been created. After that, conditions began to improve until 2007, when the US deployed an additional 30,000 troops to Iraq in the famous "surge." But four years later, Bush's successor, Barack Obama, decided to withdraw US troops in the face of deteriorating political relations with the Iraqi government.
The high cost
The results of the war were overwhelmingly negative. Yes, a horrible tyrant who had used chemical weapons against his own people and started wars against two of his neighbors was ousted. For all its flaws, Iraq today is better off than it was, and the long-persecuted Kurdish minority enjoys a degree of autonomy previously denied to it.
But the cost side as a whole is much higher. The war in Iraq claimed the lives of approx 200,000 Iraqi civilians and 4,600 US troops. The economic cost to the US was hers in the order of 2 trillion dollars and the war has tipped the balance of power in the region in favor of neighboring Iran, which has increased its influence in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, in addition to Iraq.
The war also isolated the US, due to its decision to fight alongside only a few partners and without explicit support from the United Nations. Millions of Americans became disillusioned with their government and US foreign policy, helping to set the stage for the anti-government populism and foreign policy isolationism that has dominated US politics in recent years. The war ultimately proved to be a costly distraction. Without it, the US might have been in a much better position to reorient its foreign policy to deal with a more aggressive Russia and a more assertive China.
The lessons of war are many. Choice wars should only be undertaken with extreme caution and consideration of potential costs and benefits, as well as alternatives. This was not done in the case of Iraq. In contrast, decision-making at the highest levels was often informal and lacked rigor. Lack of local knowledge was pervasive. It might seem obvious to suggest that it's dangerous or even reckless to invade a country you don't understand, but that's exactly what the US did.
Assumptions can be dangerous traps. The decision to go to war was based on a worst-case assessment that Iraq possessed WMDs and would use them or provide them to those who would. But if foreign policy always operated on this basis, interventions would be required everywhere. What is needed is a balanced consideration of the most likely scenarios, not just the worst.
Ironically, the analysis of what would follow a battlefield victory in Iraq erred in the opposite direction: American officials placed all their chips on the best-case scenario. After rolling out the welcome carpet to those who had freed them from Saddam, Iraqis would quickly put aside their religious differences and embrace democracy. We know what happened instead. The fall of Saddam became a moment for violent reckoning and competition for position. Promoting democracy is a difficult task. It is one thing to oust a leader and a regime, but another to put a better, lasting alternative in its place.
Enduring Myths
However, common critiques of the war err when they conclude that the US government could never be trusted to tell the truth. Yes, the US government argued that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and my boss at the time, Secretary of State Colin Powell, took that case to the United Nations. Turns out that wasn't true.
But governments can and do get things wrong without lying. More than anything else, the period before the Iraq war demonstrated the danger of leaving cases unsolved. Saddam's refusal to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors was seen as evidence that he had something to hide. He did, but what he was hiding wasn't WMDs but the fact that he didn't have them. This revelation, he feared, would make him appear weak to his neighbors and his own people.
Others have argued that the war was waged at Israel's behest. And that's not true. I remember meetings with Israeli officials who suggested that the US was going to war with the wrong country. They saw Iran as the far greater threat. But these officials refrained from saying so publicly, because they felt that Bush was determined to go to war with Iraq and did not want to anger him with futile efforts to prevent it.
Nor did the US go to war for oil, as many on the left have often insisted. Narrow commercial interests are not generally what animate US foreign policy, especially when it comes to the use of military force. Rather, interventions are based and motivated by considerations of strategy, ideology, or both. Indeed, former President Donald Trump criticized his predecessors for not demanding a share of Iraq's oil reserves.
The Iraq War also contains a warning about the limits of bipartisanship, which is often touted in US politics as a guarantee of good policy. But it's not like that. There was overwhelming bipartisanship before not only the Iraq War but also the Vietnam War. The 2002 vote authorizing the use of military force against Iraq passed with clear support from both major political parties. But even before that, President Bill Clinton's administration and Congress had come together, in 1998, to call for regime change in Iraq. More recently, we have seen bipartisanship in opposition to free trade and in favor of leaving Afghanistan and dealing with China.
But just as broad political support does not guarantee that a policy is right or good, narrow support does not necessarily mean that a policy is wrong or bad. The 1990-91 Gulf War – in which the US successfully led a UN-backed international coalition that liberated Kuwait at minimal cost – barely passed Congress, due to significant Democratic opposition. Whether or not a policy has bipartisan support tells us nothing about the quality of the policy.
In 2009, I wrote one book arguing that the 2003 Iraq War was a malicious war of choice. More than a decade later, and 20 years after the start of the war, I see no reason to modify this view. It was a bad decision, poorly executed. The US and the world are still living with the consequences.
Source: project-syndicate