Instead of a new article on the causes that led to the Decembriana I quote the opinions of 15 historians, politicians, journalists, researchers and scholars of the time in this second part of the historical tribute.
In Part 2The the following books are mentioned: Tasos Vournas "Modern History of Greece", Gavriil Lambatos "KKE and Power", Evangelos Averof Tositsas "Fire and Axe", Yiannis Ioannidis "Memories", Richard Clogg "A Brief History of Modern Greece".
I have tried to strike a balance with respect to their political sensibilities, although most are on the left for the simple reason that the majority of the literature comes from the left. The Decembriana is one of the darkest moments in modern Greek history, and dozens of books have been written about it.
What concerns the present article is not the civil conflict that began on December 3, but what led to it.
It is a big historical mistake to think that the Decembers started because of the victims of the December 3 rally at the Syntagma.
Everything had been set in motion much earlier; the period of approximately 40 days, from the moment of the liberation of Athens (October 18) until Sunday, December 3, played a decisive role.
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TASSOS VOURNAS
From his book "Modern History of Greece"
We have seen that Churchill was "absolutely convinced that we would have a conflict with the EAM and that we should not try to avoid it provided we chose the ground well" (phone call to Eden 11.11.44).
Churchill was certainly no prophet. It simply reveals that the British were marching according to a plan to exterminate the Greek resistance.
Part of the plan was the dispatch to Athens on November 9, 1944 of the Third Mountain Brigade, which the British released from the Italian front. Its commander was colonel T. Tsakalotos and its force included 205 officers and 2530 soldiers. Its composition had been achieved after repeated purges of the powers of the Middle East and its presence in Greece was a counterweight to the Left, which, due to its excellent organization, dominated the masses and had politically pushed the so-called nationalist organizations into the corner.
The government of national unity in the face of public outcry against the Gendarmerie, which as a rule had faithfully served the conqueror, accepted its dissolution, in accordance with the general promises to the left. However, an attempt was made to demonize it and instead of carrying out the dissolution and calling up the class of 1936, which would undertake police duties in the country under the title "National Guard" (the city police had agreed to be reorganized after being cleared of the fiscal elements ), the men of the gendarmerie gathered secretly in Makrygianni's barracks, where they were equipped and placed under the command of loyalists of the Right. They were exactly the ones who, during the December conflict, were the "iron fist" of nationalism against ELAS, in friendly cooperation with the British.
Also a reserve of the right was the organization "X", equipped by the Germans, which was under the leadership of colonel Grivas, the ultimate confidant of the army and the junta in Cyprus.
THE ARMY PROBLEM
And while the right, under the insistence of the English, was preparing its positions for an upcoming confrontation, the problem of organizing the future military national forces was plaguing political life.
The problem was raised with the statements of G. Papandreou on November 5, 1944:
"After the complete liberation of Greece, our heroic Resistance ends. It is therefore natural that the demobilization of our rebel resistance groups ELAS and EDES follows, which was set for December 10th.
The permanent officers of the rebel corps return to our regular army, where they will have a position according to the national service.
Reserve officers, if they wish to become permanent, will enter a special training school.
The details of the demobilization method will be determined in consultation with the leaders of the rebel groups General Sarafi and Zervan"
The planned army, according to the government's specifications, would consist of 1,500 permanent veteran officers and 500 reservists from ELAS regulars. Commander-in-Chief would be the democratic general Alexandros Othonaios. The new commander-in-chief requested, as a condition of assuming the leadership of the new army, to have General Stefanos Sarafi as his chief of staff, but he ran into the refusal of the English pro-general of the Greek area Scobie. Following the refusal, Othonaios resigned.
Thickening clouds began to form in the sky of Greek liberation.
December 10 was set as the last day for the disbandment of armed resistance organizations and the surrender of their weapons. On November 5, G. Papandreou declared again, amidst an electrified political atmosphere:
"The real situation that the government has found itself in since its arrival in Greece is that the gendarmerie almost everywhere has ceased to exist and has been replaced by the National Militia of EAM - ELAS. In order to restore the functioning of the state, the following decisions were taken unanimously by the entire Government:
1. The National Militia of EAM-ELAS is under the orders of the government and its representatives until December 1st, when it will surrender service and cease to exist throughout Greece. Excludes the region of the capital (Athens-Piraeus-Perichoro) where the city police operates and where the National Militia has already ceased to exist.
2. A temporary National Guard corps is recommended. The class of 1936 by province is called for this purpose. He will arrive in each provincial capital on November 24 and take office on December 1. It will be under the command of shore officers, permanent and reserve. A senior shore officer will be designated as the head of the National Guard, subject to the orders of the minister of the military....”
On the morning of November 26, 1944, Scobi invited a delegation of ELAS to his headquarters to meet with him and the representatives of EDES on the issue of disbanding the armed forces of the resistance. ELAS was represented by Sarafis, General Mantakas, and Colonel Papastamatiadis.
(…) An example of the traps against the left and ignoring what was agreed upon was the deployment of 250 National Guard officers without the knowledge of the left, none of whom served in ELAS, by the Deputy Minister of Military Affairs Lambrianidis, a personal friend of G. Papandreou. The revelation of the embezzlement obliges the prime minister to remove the ministry from Lambrianidis.
REPUBLIC OF EAM. RESIGNATION OF PRIVATE MINISTERS
To defuse the impending crisis and find a military solution, the German ministers submitted the following counter-plan to the prime minister. Here's what was going on:
"On December 10, 1944, the National Resistance forces ELAS and EDES, as well as the military formations located in the Middle East, will be demobilized. A section of the National Army will be formed to symbolically continue its participation in the common allied struggle and also take part, if required, in the regions of Crete and the Dodecanese. In this part of the National Army, which will also symbolize national unity, the existing mountain brigade, the holy company and section of the EDES, as well as an ELAS brigade with a strength equal to the sum of the above forces and equal armament will participate ».
The counter-plan of the EAM, which included the creation of a single large unit with full mixing of men, was rejected and the prime minister proposed to create four separate units: ELAS, EDES, Mountain Brigade and Holy Company.
In this mixed, but consisting of independent corps units, the right would have 3/4 of the strength while ELAS with only 1/4 strength against the other united, under Scobi's discretionary authority, it would be possible to send wherever it is isolated. The non-acceptance of the Eamian counter-plan led to the split and EAM ministers Svolos, Zevgos, Tsirimokos, Angelopoulos, Askoutsis and general Sarigiannis resigned.
The coming crisis was announced by G Papandreou with the following statements:
"The following day, Friday, December 1, the Eamian militia had to surrender to the national guard. But I received contrary orders under the command of EAM, he refused to deliver. The president of the government then proposed that a decision of the Council of Ministers be drawn up ordering the Greek militia to hand over to the National Guard. The text of the decision stated that the signature was a matter of trust. All the ministers of the extreme left, except General Sarigiannis, who refused to sign, submitted their resignations. And the crisis came."
The conflict now began to be openly planned. The ELAS headquarters was being reorganized and its force stopped obeying Scobi's orders. On December 2, the Central Committee of EAM decided to organize a rally for the following day, Sunday, December 3, at Syntagma. The unarmed people were under armed attack by right-wing forces and the Police lined up on the stairs of the Old Palaces and the Police Headquarters at the corner of B. Sofia and Panesopitui. Result 28 dead protesters. The December showdown was now a reality, the "gift from God" offered to the Right by the Left's unfounded politics.
And to what extent it was unreal was proved by Dimitrov's message that arrived very late, December 19, 1944, when everything had been decided:
"I think that with the current international situation, armed support to the Greek comrades from the outside is generally impossible. (…)
Greeks and ELAS must determine their further steps starting from this very situation, not favorable for them. They should not pull the strings... Wait for a more favorable moment to implement their democratic program..."
But the rope had been pulled and the noose tightened around the neck of the National Resistance, resulting in its exhaustion...
One of the greatest delusions of the Eamian leadership was that the English would not dare to intervene in the December conflict between Right and Left in Greece.
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GABRILIS LAMPATOS
From the book "KKE and Power"
In this context, the leadership of the KKE was called to negotiate the formation of the national army and the disarmament of ELAS, which for the British side and George Papandreou was a condition for ensuring the dominance of pro-British forces and the political neutralization of ELAS.
It was normal for the negotiations to be conducted in a climate of absolute suspicion. After all, since the years of national division, the Greek army played a decisive role in political developments. How could a non-partisan army be set up now that would at the same time be a guarantor of smooth political developments?
The undertaking was difficult and required sensitive political handling.
The policy of national reconciliation constantly caused friction in the leadership group, while in ELAS Aris Velouchiotis was against any form of reconciliation with the British factor. His position in the party hierarchy did not carry weight (he was not even a member of the KKE central committee), but this does not mean that he did not influence a significant number of military officials who could influence the decisions of the narrow leadership core. After all, all the previous months he made sure to communicate his concerns about the implemented policy to many party officials. During those days, consultations were held on the formation of the new national army and on the person who would be its head, Aris Velouchiotis took the initiative to hold a meeting of the ELAS captains in Lamia (November 17 and 18, 1944).
The speech of Aris Velouchiotis was at the opposite of the political directions that the leading core of the KKE had favored in those days.
He considered that the presence of the English troops would be an inhibiting factor for the aspirations of ELAS and at the same time, that it was necessary to prepare for a full confrontation with the British forces. The meeting was led to an impasse when Markos Vafiadis, the only KKE military officer who was also a member of the party's central committee, asked if the members of the Politburo knew about the meeting, thus raising the question of whether they had the authority to decide on such a serious matter issues. In the end, perhaps all this meeting offered was the famous photo of the Resistance captains. However, this climate undoubtedly influenced the decisions of the leading core of the KKE.
What impresses the researcher is the fact that in a few days there was a radical change in the attitude of the leadership core regarding the army being formed. It is typical that after the appointment of General Sarigiannis as Deputy Minister of Military Affairs, Aris Velouchiotis gave the order to immediately report to the National Guard those ELAS fighters who belonged to the class of 1936.
As he noted, in the National Guard "...only those who were deployed by order signed by Deputy Minister Sarigiannis will be accepted".
But the political balances remained extremely fragile. The royalists were firmly oriented to the need for a head-on conflict with the KKE, while the liberal camp did not fully identify with the political choices of Georgios Papandreou, who believed that it would be possible to find a compromise. The British in November 1944 were oriented towards the necessity of a dynamic confrontation with the KKE, a position they finally imposed on G. Papandreou. Data could change from moment to moment. Despite the decision of the KKE leadership to enlist the followers of the EAM and the Elasites in the national army under formation, the issue of the disarmament of the Rimini Brigade was the reason for the rupture.
As Yiannis Iatridis points out, the "factors of stability and balance are too exhausted, at the same time too inflexible to control the growing pressures for change. Under such fragile conditions, which could otherwise be easily settled, they take on a terrifying symbolic meaning, leaving no room for honest negotiations and compromises.
The leading core of the KKE was faced with the following dilemma: How could the dissolution of ELAS be justified to the party members and executives in a country where for twenty years the army put its stamp on political developments (1915-1936)? The experiences of the military's involvement in politics during the interwar years made the leadership of the KKE particularly suspicious. On the other hand, the British and the bourgeois political world knew that without control of the military they would permanently lose political control of the country. At the beginning of December, the balance in the leadership core of the KKE had changed.
During the days of the Decemberists, the political and military primacy in the KKE was held by Giorgis Siandos. The balance in the leadership core was affected by the illness of Giannis Ioannidis, who in the previous period had taken the lead so that the policy followed was characterized by political realism. In his testimony, he does not fail to emphasize that at that time the relevant party bodies were not functioning. He also does not fail to mention his serious confrontation over the choice of rupture with the secretary of the Athens organization Vassilis Barziotas, who seems to have played a decisive role in the decision to escalate the conflict.
As he characteristically stated:
"Anyway... I have the fact that I raised the issue that there should be a meeting of the Politburo as soon as I learned that they are pulling for a civil war, a general political strike as I was told....
I then immediately told him:
"Hey Vasilis, do you know what a general political strike means? It means armed rebellion. Are we today to do armed rebellion? What are these things? Did you not understand these things? Don't you have a bow tie? Didn't we talk?"
For Ioannidis, the proposal of the other side for the formation of two brigades of equal military strength could not have been rejected even if it was envisaged at the same time to maintain the Greek Rimini Brigade. There was, in his opinion, too much fear about its operational capabilities….
(…) The attack against the gathered crowd in Syntagma Square was the catalyst for a pre-decided conflict from both sides. Each side believed that through military confrontation it would secure advantages that would allow it to later dominate politically and militarily. The planning of the leadership of the KKE was incomplete militarily but above all politically. The determination of the British factor regarding Greece had been underestimated.
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Evangelos Averof Tositsas
From his book "Fire and Axe"
But it would take many pages to set forth the events that led to the revolution of December 1944. So let us mention only those of the main events that are not open to doubt, which certainly led to the most bloody uprising.
On November 22, Scobie met with Sarafi and Zerva and asked them to demobilize. Zervas immediately accepted, especially because it had been explained to him beforehand that if he refused or hesitated, he would give ELAS the excuse it was asking for not to demobilize. But Sarafis, incomparably stronger at the time, rejected Scobi's request and asked for a government order to accept it, signed by all the ministers, including those coming from PEEA.
It was a denial of what had been agreed in Caserta. A difficult impasse was thus created. Prime Minister Papandreou then addressed an appeal to his ministers who were members of the PEEA but not members of the KKE, and asked them to help him. They accepted, and if they cooperated with the "calm" Zevgos and the British military authorities, they managed to reach a new agreement, after hard negotiations. The agreement was delivered on November 27 to Papandreou by Professor Svolos, Tsirimokos (both formerly of PEEA) and Zevgos. The next day, with considerable difficulty, Papandreou managed to get the other members of his government, who come from the right and the center, to accept the agreement and announced through the press what had been agreed.
The most essential of what was agreed upon were the following:
a National Army would be created, the first major unit of which would be a division consisting of two brigades, each of equal strength. One brigade would consist of the Rimini Brigade, the Holy Company, parts of the EDES and some draftees. The other, equivalent, would include only parts of ELAS. Two more divisions would later be formed, in which officers and men who had served in ELAS would be assigned. All rebels of any organization would be disarmed and demobilized.
It was a clear strengthening of the position of the extreme left. Nevertheless, on the same day, in the afternoon of the 28th, an unexpected change took place: Zevgos requested the demobilization of the Rimini Brigade and the Sacred Company and demanded that the disarmament of the rebels be thwarted. What had happened; Who or what had caused this radical conversion within 24 hours? The conversion was so unpredictable and dangerous that the next day Svolos described it as "sudden and inexplicable".
Many interpretations have been given:
- Privy Council of Moscow, which, remaining neutral, would gladly see its game continued by another. The interpretation is not convincing, because everything shows that then Stalin honestly offered Greece as an object of transaction.
- The intransigent had prevailed. A more serious interpretation, but not entirely convincing, given that negotiations had preceded the agreement, and that everyone had agreed on the text given to Papandreou.
- A third interpretation was also argued in the face of Soviet neutrality, "the KKE hardliners had asked Tito for advice and moral support, at the same time informing him that the British forces that had landed were weak and much smaller than those expected. Tito had replied, late in the evening of the 27th, that they had to occupy the capital and that he would offer his moral assistance to the KKE.
It is difficult to take a position as to the interpretation to be given. Perhaps the truth will never be known. However, it is certain that a new event, which took place on the night of November 27 to 28, will change the moods of the KKE leaders. It made them exercise a hard-fought agreement and seek the showdown. The government could only reject Zevgos' terms. Accepting them would mean surrendering with tied hands. On the evening of the 29th, the cabinet met under Papandreou, without inviting ministers from PEEA.
The following day, the EAM police refused to carry out a government decision that had been taken on the 24th of the month, and it concerned its replacement by the National Guard. The National Guard had just been formed and included men of the class of 1936 who had fought in Albania. On the same day, ELAS units, well armed thanks to the armaments left behind by the Germans, gathered around the capital. Howitzers and cannons occupied positions on the hills overlooking the city. Zevgos, despite the nickname "the calm one", published an article in the KKE newspaper in which, among other things, he said that "the time for negotiations has passed" and that "only weapons could solve the differences".
On December 2, the PEEA member ministers resigned, and the government issued a decree disbanding every rebel organization. All permanent officers were required to report immediately to the War Department. Among the latter were those who served in the ranks of ELAS. Arms and ammunition, of any kind, were to be immediately handed over to the authorities.
The KKE responded with a challenge that seemed to be addressed on behalf of EAM and PEEA – bodies which essentially did not exist and in any case were not represented by the KKE alone.
The challenge was of the utmost practical importance. The people were called for a pandemonium event in the center of the capital on December 3rd, and the workers were called for a general strike on December 4th.
The rally on December 3rd took place, although it was banned by the government.
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YIANNIS IOANNIDIS
From his book "Memories" (Yiannis Ioannidis was secretary of the KKE at that time together with G. Siados)
"Until then, I was under the impression that this whole thing happened with the blow they gave us on December 3rd. When I learned that the central committee of ELAS was established on December 1st, this means that we too were premeditated to give a reason to start the war. There is no more... You decide on a general political strike.."
On another point:
"The problem is that we made a decision on the 17th, apart from the others the first ones I've seen, on the 17th of November or the 16th or the 18th... I don't know when it was... what I remember is that we made a decision. They were all members of the politburo. The meeting took place at the hospital where I was. We didn't sit for long because I'm sick. Half an hour or three quarters. Agree on everything. We said that if we did not manage to find other political solutions to the issue, we would clash
(pp. 325 and 332)
"So what was supposed to be done was not done. Which any mertic would do. Civil war, without the central committee knowing that a civil war is taking place."
Regarding the Soviet envoy Popov:
“So Popov the Russian comes to the hospital, because I had contact with him.
Journalist: In Athens?
Yes, in Athens, he comes to the hospital and says to me: What will happen?
I tell him: "We will get caught, we will definitely get caught."
Regarding his conversation with Vassilis Moartziotas, secretary of the Athens Party Organization of the KKE:
"After all, I have you in mind that I raised the issue that there should be a meeting of the political office as soon as I learned that they (ELAS) are calling for a civil war, a general political strike as you call it.
At that time I had said to him, "Hey Vasilis, do you know what a general political strike means?" It means armed rebellion. Are we today to do armed rebellion? What are these things? Did you not understand these things? Don't you have a bow tie? Didn't we talk?"
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RICHARD CLOGG
From the book "A Brief History of Modern Greece"
The most serious problem facing Papandreou was how to achieve the peaceful disarmament of the rebels and their replacement by a national army, without whose support the government could not hope to rule the country for long.
As long as the forces of ELAS continued to exist, even if they were under the command of Scobi, the balance of physical power was clearly on the side of ELAS and not with the Greek government. During November, prolonged negotiations between Papandreou and leftist ministers resulted in a solution acceptable to both sides.
The main part of the agreement was that the rebel groups of ELAS and E.D.E.S. were to be disbanded on December 10, except for one ELAS unit, which would be equal in size to the unit made up of the Holy Word, the Mountain Brigade and one EDES unit. The Holy Company was manned only by officers and the Mountain Brigade of Rimini had been completely wiped out after the mutinies that would take place in the middle east the previous April. The left claimed, quite justifiably, that only royalists and anti-communists were left. These two Units were to form the core of the national army, which would be supplemented by the call-up of certain ages for enlistment.
At the end of November the communists, accusing Papandreou of backtracking on the commitments he had made, demanded a general demilitarization. A harder line was then presented, which in fact represented a victory for EAM hardliners, who believed that the party should have moved to seize power in October and who were now asking for an opportunity for a head-on confrontation with Papandreou.
The clumsiness and confusion on all sides, the left, the national government and the British, began to rapidly lead to a seemingly inevitable tragic escalation. At the beginning of December, Georgios Siandos, general secretary of the KKE, announced that ELAS was not surrendering its weapons on December 10, so General Scobie declared that he would not hesitate, if necessary, to use British troops in order to defend the legally constituted government.
The left-wing ministers resigned from the Papandreou government and in an atmosphere of intensifying crisis, the EAM called, for Sunday, December 3, the people to a massive rally, it was the prelude to a general strike. Papandreou, after initially agreeing to the rally, later revoked the permission, but thousands of Athenians gathered in Syntagma Square in the center of the city. The police panicked and opened fire on the protesters killing 15 people and injuring many more.
*Cover photo: British soldiers at the junction of Panepistimiou and Kriezotou streets